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CHAPTER 6 
Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
In  this fina1i chapter I sla~mmarize the dissertation. I n  addition to a discussion of the 
implications of the findings, I provide some directions folr future research in the area 
of multi-task principal-agent models and incentive schemes. 
6.2 Summary 
Economic theory suggests thlat financial ince~ntives are optimal for agents to induce 
effort in single-task settings. However, theory predicts that in multi-taslk settin~gs 
where performance on different tasks are measured with different levels of 
precision, financial incentives can lead to an effort alllocation between tasks that  is 
not necessarily Fn line with the objectives of the principal. Risk-averse agents tend 
to prefer effart on a precisely measured task over effort on a task measlured with1 
noise. A sol~uition put fomard in the literature is to offer agents a fixed wage, so that 
effort can be allocated in line with organizational objectives - assuming that agents 
are willing to deliver effort at all and do not f o l l ~ w  a randbm st~rategy. Emplrilcal 
findings put forward that individuals are not only motivated bly mearvs of explicit 
financial incentives, as frequently argu~ed by economic theory. Rather, individuals 
are also motivated by irnpl~icit financial i~ncentives, like ca~reer concerns, and non- 
filnancn'al incentives, like reputation and social status. Total incelntives of an 
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individual are thus a combination of explicit financial incentives and implicit financial 
and non-financial incentives. 
The purpose of this disser"katio1n is to give answers to the following two research 
questions: 
How do expllciit financial Incentives influence effort aS/ocation in multi-task 
agency settings? 
What role do other forms OS incentives, such as socia! jncentives and 
career concerns, play? 
The focus in this dissertation is thus on how financial incentives and oth~er forms of 
imlotiitati~on influence effort allocatlion of algents in a multi-task setting. I have 
examined the two research questions by mealbus of two experimental studies with 
business students from Maastricht University. 
6.2.5 The ra!e of fjnancfal and socfal incentives 
The objective of the stu~dy described in chapter 4 is to examine the influence of 
social incentives (group norms) and eth~ical concerns (individual n~orms) on effort 
allocation OF agents who are exposed to dlistorting financial incentives in a multi-task 
setting. Participants work for an experimental firm on two independent tasks a~nd 
are informed that an equal output on both tasks 8s optimal for the Firm. Participants 
are randomly assignled to one of the following four treatments: (1) fixed wageJno 
social Incentives, (2) fixed wagetsocial incentives, (3) Financial incentivesjno social 
i~ncentives, and 14) financial incentives/sacial incentives. I find that subjects who 
receive financial incentives on one task significantly reduce their effort on the other 
ta~sk, whilch is consistent with agency theory. Contrary to agency theory, however, I 
find that su~bjects do not purely act in self-interest when exposed to congruent social 
incentives. In  particular, results of this study show that the 
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distarted effort allocation caused by financial incentives is signvficantly reduced, bath 
in statistical and economic terms, by social incentives and ethical concerns. 
Results thus indicate that the effort allocation of subjects is not solely driven by 
financial incentives, blut also by the desire fo~r social approval and internalized 
wallues. This finding has important managerial implications given that managelrial 
choices affect the social incentives within an ~rgan~sat ion.  Results OF this study are 
summarized in table 6.1. 
TABLE 6.1 
The Rote of Financial Incentives and Social Incentives in Multi-Task Settings 
-- 
Hypothesis 
Efdort a~llocation lowest with FI', higher with FT and S I ~ ,  1 - supported 
and highest with fixed wages 
Ethical concerns lower distorting effect of F I  2 - not supported 
Etlhical concerns positively interad with SI t o  decrease 3 - sup~ported 
distorting effect of F I  
a Financial incentives 
Social incentives 
Findings o f  this study co~ntribwite to  the literature in many ways. This study is one of 
the first So investigate the role of Pinalncial and social incentives bn a mullti-taslk 
agency setting. The Irnp~ortant roles of social incen~tives as well as internalized 
vallues, such as ethical concerns, are underlined. Further, this study shows that 
the~re are settings where financial incentives are preferred over fixed wages despilte 
being distorted and although performance of the agent on one task is not measured. 
Finally, results suggest that the a~gency problem is not alnly about indu~cing effort, 
but also a~bout indu,cing the 'right' effort, because there is a tradeoff between effort 
alllclcation and the overall effort levels desired by the pnincipall. 
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weighted finalncial incentives), which is at oddis with standard a~rgwments in the 
literature. Results in~dicate that effort is allmost evenly balanced between tasks when 
there are career concerns and a higher financial incentive weight on the task 
measured with noise, suggesting that career concerns and explicit Encentlve weights 
are not substitutes but complements. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. It is one of the first 
empirical1 studies examining the role of career concerns in a mullti-task setting. 
There is evidence that fixed wages are not necessarily optimal, because agents have 
an economic incentive to  prefer effort on a precisely measured task when there are 
career concerns. Fuslt1her, the relationship between risk and incentives can be 
positive. I n  presence of career concerns, finanlcial incentives with a higher weight on 
a noisy task can help to mitigate effects of implicit incentives due ta career 
concerns. Explicit financial incentowes thus counterbal~ance these effects, Results 
indlicate that financial incentive weights and career concerns complement each 
other. Table 6.2 summlarises the findings o f  this study. 
TABLE 6.2 
The Role of Career Concerns in Hwltil-Task Settings on Effort Alllocation caf 
Agents 
Hy,potl.eesis; 
Career concerns .-. effort on precise taslk 1. - su~ppai-ked 
No career concerns -+ fixed wage *'~ptimal" 2 - supported 
Witlh career concerns -+ Unequally weighted financial 3 - sulpported 
incentives "'optimal" 
Findilngs of this dissertation have both theoretical and managerial lrnplicatians. 
Whereas theory predicts that fixed wages may be optimal En rnultl-task settings for 
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effort allocation purposes, it sleerns that many multi-task jobs alre not compensated 
with Wxed wages. Especially managerial jobs in higher EeveUs of an or~ganization are 
characterized by multi-tasking, and are frequently compensated with performance- 
based finlancial incentives. Incentive compensation is, however, not only used to 
rnoti~vate employees to work, but is also used to attract the "right' people for certain 
jobs. This holds especially far higher levels in an organization, where financial 
incentives are simply expected as standard cornpensatlon practice. The wide use of 
Financial incentives and the apparent lack of alternatives for various reasons stress 
the importance of the findings and implications of this dissertation. 
First, financial incentives have a strong impact on effort allocation. However, iln 
addition t o  the effects of financial incentives, individuals are motivated also by other 
mechanisms, such as implicit: financ~al incentives as well as group and individual 
norms (~.e., social incentives and ethical concerns). Nan-financial motivations are 
thus important for individuals in their action choice and can have implications for 
organizatiional values and principles and can be an issue for recruiting and selection 
of individuals For certain jobs. 
Second, i t  may not be beneficial for a princtpal to offer fixed wages, because fixed 
wages can lead to lower overall effort. Further, in presence of career concerns, 
effort under fixed wages is not necessarily in line with the objectives of the 
principal, because the agent's allocation Is influenced by career concerns anld signals 
to a labor market. It is necessalry to ulnderstand motivatioinal mechanisms for 
individual action choice in order to determine the appropria~teness of fixed wages. 
Third, whereas the literature suggests that explicit Rnancial incentives and career 
con~cerns are substitutes, results of this dissertation put forward that the two are not 
substitutes, bu~t even co~m~plernent each other. For compensation practice it may be 
necessary to use explicit financial i~ncentives in order to counter motivational effects 
due to calreer concerns. Given an almost omnipresence of career concerns, it is thus 
necessary to conside~r such concerns in the design of an incentive scheme. 
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Fourth, theory predicts tlhlat there is a negative relationlship between risk and 
incentives. However, this dissertation shows a situation where the relationship is not 
negative but positive. To colunterbalance the effects of career concerns it may bc 
necessary to  increase the incentive weights on tasks that are measured with high 
levels of noise, because these tasks are ignored by the labor market. 
Contracts between a principal and an agent are a trade-off between thle level of 
financial incentives a~nd the risk imposed on an agent. HigU7,er risk needs to be 
~om~pensated with a risk premium, with the result that Financial incentives are 
muted in velry risky environments because compensation cost is boo higlh. 
Prendergast (2OOZa) alrgues that this trade-off between risk and incentives is rather 
difficult to detect empirically, and mixed evidence on tlhis trade-off may even 
suggest that the relatiolnship is net negative. Bonus and incentive schemes are 
commoln for rna~nagers not only irln very stable industries, but also in highly volatile 
anld risky industries, such a~s the high-tech industry. More specific, Prendergast 
(2002A) gives four arguments why one would no t  see a negative relationship 
between risk and incen~tive weiglhts. First, monitoring of managerial inputs is less 
effective in uncertain envi~ronments. The principal1 is more lilkelly to offer an outcome- 
based Incentive contract in very uncertain environments as h,e does not have a clear 
idea what exactly the agent should spend his time on. Second, sorting and t~ruthful 
petforrnalnce appraisals are less effecti,ve in uncertain environments. I n  particular, i f  
repartis of supervisors are less reliable, a firm may clhoose to increalse Financial 
incentives to induce effort of the agent, becawse performance a~pp~raisals become 
more noisy and incorrect. Third, sporadic investigations on the agent's performance 
are less effective in uncertain environments. Agents suffer less from investigations 
in rislky environments becawse they can easier "get away" with bad performlance lru 
noisy enwi~ronments than in stable environ~m~ents. To motivate the agent, however, a 
firm may choose to increase financial incentives based on the performance of the 
agent. Fourth, agents have reputation alnd career concerns. These concerns, 
however, are less effective in noisy environrnen~ts, where results of individual ag~ents 
are difficult to assess by others. Hn such settings financial incentives are nleeded to  
induce effort of the agent t o  overcame shortcomings of evaluations of a labor 
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market (career concern~s] or others. As mentioned by Prendergast (21002a3, these 
reasons are not meant to c la~m that agency theory is 'Wrong" in the assumption of a 
negative relationship between risk and Irrcenti\yres. But the reasons above can be 
instances where th~e relationship between risk and in~centives may be different. 
6.4 Limitations 
The studies of this dissertation are bath experimental studies. The use of 
experiments in accounting research is ilncreasing for various realsons. By means of 
laboratory experiments, one can investigate issues that are diFficult to  detect with 
Field data. The main reason for choosing an experiment is to control everything 
except for the variables of interest. By keeping everything else constant one can 
infer a clear relationship that ils not distracted by noise. Even further, experiments 
are the most suitable method to detect causal relationships (Shadish et al. 20012). 
Experimental research Is subject to severall specific lim~itations that I will discuss 11n 
detail, in this section. 
First, h~igh internal vai~idity often leadls to rather abst~ract experiments. Lack of 
realism is one of the most frequlently raised concerns with experiments. The 
question i s  h~ow far results form experimental research can be generalized. How high 
is th~e external validity, i.e., do results generalize over different popwlatlans and 
different situations. Experiments cannot be a milrror of real-life. I f  they were, one 
co~uld also use field data for research. The strelngth of experimen~tal research is that 
one can investigate certain selected variables witholut noise. Usually, thle variablles 
of interest are elmlbeddecl in the environment together with many ather variables, so 
that it is impossible to draw concl~~sions on these valriables alone. The fact that 
laboratory experiments are not very realistic is tlhus a limitation but is at the sam~e 
time a strength and even a necesslity. 
Second, a limitation of the studies of this dissertation is the use of very simp~lified 
tasks. For the first study participants are asked to indicate their effort level. There is 
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thus no "real" effort of perform~ing a certain task. I n  the second experiment, 
participants are asked to decade numbers based on a decoding key. Tlie tasks are 
thus no typical managerial tasks, but serve the purpose to rule out any intrinsic 
motivation because of the tasks, to ruYe out certain skills and talents, and to keep 
necessary pre-knowledge as low as possible. Nevertheless, results QF the studies 
here could be different with other types of tasks, for example problem-solv[ng or 
memory tasks. 
Third, the short duration of the experiments may pose another limitation. Due to  the 
short duration, endoge~nous reputation building and other dynamic Factors are 
excluded. H~owever, such aspects cauld play an imlportant role and lead to ditferent 
results. The design of the experiments and the fact that they are laboratory 
experiments and no field experiments, do not allow longitudinal studies of the 
relevant variables. 
A filnal remark concerns the use of student participants in experiments. There Is a 
continuous debate on whether students behave differently than managers or other 
employees. Until now, there is no consensus on this iksue. I cannot find a 
reasonabl~e argument that stu,dents behave differently than employees of a firm. 
With respect to the incentives provided in the experiments, it may be a question on 
the level of financial incentives, but there i s  hardly any reason why students would 
behave in an opposite direct~an than employees AIR any of the two stu~dles. 
6.5 Fwtura research 
Resul~ts of this dilssertation open several Interesting avenues for future research. 
First, the financial incentive schemes examined In the studies are piece-rate 
schemes. There are many oth~er forms of financiall inlcenti\ses that can possi~bily lead 
to different results in multi-task settings. Bonus schemes or stock options, For 
example, can il~ndwce agents to behave less short-term ori~ented and myopic, but 
consider the long-term value of a firm. 
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Second, the study on the role of social incentives has indicated tlhe strong effects d 
such Incentives. Nevertheless, communicatl~an between subjects was not allowed 
and the group norm was cxogen~auls. Commu~rnicatjon between participants and 
extending the time Frame of the experiment allows a groulp norm to dewellop or 
change over time. It could be interesting to find out how a norm endogenously 
develops over time, and how and why a group norm chang~es. Research in this 
directi~on can help to u~nderstand group behavior better, and can mitigate social 
incentive proble~nn~s and incangruent behavior due to  grow,p dynamics. 
Third, findlings of the studly ON social incentives indicate that there is a tradeoff 
between effort alllocation and overall effort level. Analytical research could tackle 
this tradeofl and analyze this tradeoff. Incorporating the dilemma of effort allocation 
and effort level in agency models could exte~nd theory further alnd help to 
understand m~ulti-task settings bette~r. 
Fourth, the study on career con~cerns allowed signaling of one type of ability. 
However, in a mare complex situation employees with different abilities can signal 
these different abilities to the labor rna~rket. It is thus possible tha~t employees 
compete not necessarily with the same (sig~naled) abilities but with different abilities 
alnd a labo~r market needs to trade-off an emplloyee with different ab~ilities. Given the 
simplicity of the task, agents could nlot signal different abilities to the labor market, 
This may change with increasingly complex tasks, It may be inte~resting to 
investigate whether and how results hold in a similar setting but with different 
abilities and more complex expcrim~ental tasks. 
Finally, cormpalring the two stludies of this dissertation, one can see an interesting 
findi~ncj with respect to total effort under fixed wages. Participa~nts of the first study 
hardly delivered any effort with fixed wages, but participants of the second study 
delivered almost equal levels of total effort with fixed wages than their colleagues 
with fina~ncial incentives. This seems to contradict economic theory. Economic theory 
predicts that individuals do not deliver any effort at all wh~en not given a 
pe~formance-based compensation. The predictions of economic theory are to some 
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extent satisfied in the first study under fixed wages blut not on the seeo~nd one. I 
argue that given the fact that participants of the experiment could allot leave and 
directly exchange effort for leisure, participants derived some utility from work. Plln 
interesting avenue for future research can be to investigate the influence of fixed 
wages on effort of in,diviiduals using different experimental methodologies. 'There are 
thus situations where fixed wages lead to effort, and there are situations where this 
is not  the case. Future research could investigate the determinants "chat induce 
individuals to deliver effort under fixed wages. 
SWMMARY IN DWTCH 
Dit proefschrift o~mschrijft twee experimenten over finansiele en niet-financi@le 
prikkels, die personen motiveren te werken. Beide experimenten belichten een 
principaal-agent situatie in eeln zogenaamde multi-tack olmgeving, waar de 
principaal van zijn agent wemacht zich ter geli~jkertijd op meerdere taken te richten. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk bevat de inleiding van het proefschrift en beschrijft hoe de 
onderzochte wraglen En de maInagemenlt accoulnting literatuur passen. Een van de 
meest belangrij~ke kwesties in management accounting is de vraag, hoe men het 
gedrag van individue~n kan stirinuileren/beinvloeden in de richting van de 
doelstellingen van de arg~anisatie. Een van de vele mlanieren om werknemers te 
motiveren is het geven van financieile prikkels op basis wan hun prestaties. Op basis 
van een prestatiemaatstaf kunnen beloning~en verstrekt worden. Een specifiek 
probleem binnen multi-task omgeving~en is het verschil in meetbaarheid van de 
ver.~chiillelnde prestatiemaatstaven diie gebru~ikt worden voor verschillende taken. 
Prestaties op een bepaalde taak kunnen wellicht beter gemeten worden dan 
prestaties op een andere taa~k. Deze verschille~n kunnen tot een allocatile van werk 
lelden die overeenstemt met de vao~rkeur van de werknemer, maar niet met de 
doelen van de organisatie. De meetbaarheid en daarmee de kwaliteit van 
~&srecl;atiemaatstavem is dus van Envloed op de allocatie van werk tusse~n de te 
verrichten taken. In een extreem voorbeelid zijn prestaties op een bepa~alde taak 
perfect: te meten, terwijl deze onmeetbaar zijn voor een andere taak. Vervolgens zal 
een werknemer zich vvelllcht alleen op die taak richteln, die ook gemeten kan worden 
om z i ~ n  e~igen evaluatie en beloning te verbeteren. 
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De vragen die En dit proefschrift centraal staan, zijn: 
IJ Welke invloed hebben expliciete beloningsystemen op de allocatie wan werk in 
een rnulti-task omgeving? 
2) Welke rol spelen andere vormen van motivatie, zoals sociale druk of lange 
termijn effecten? 
I n  hoofdstuk Z beschrijf ik de economische modellen, die voor dik proefschrift valn 
belang zijn. Een expliciet en prestatieafhankelijk contract tussen eien principaal en 
een agent is in een single-kask omgeving optimaai om de agent te motiveren om 
zich in zijn werk te  richten op de doielstelilingen van de organisatie. Modellen van 
een mlwlti-task omgeving laten echter zien, dat in een dergelijke situatie een 
exlpliciet en prectatieafhankelijk contract niet altijd optimaal is voor een organisatie. 
In een, multi-task omgeving kan een expliciet contract leiden to t  een verdelling van 
taken die niet in lijn is met de doelen van de organisatie. 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de empbrische literatuur op het gebied van principaal-agent 
theorie. De empirische literatuur bevestigt economische theorie en laak zien dat 
financiele prikkels van invloed zijn op het gedrag wan lndi,viduen. Verder toon 11k in 
hoofdstuk 3 aan, dat de empirische literatuur som,mige aannames van economische 
'theorie niet s.teunt. Individuen zijn blijkbaar niiet alleen gelnteresseerd hun eigen 
beloning te  maximelren, maar hechten ook belang aaln reciprociteit, sociale reputatie 
en lange termlijn effecten van hun werk. Dit zijn meectal Impliciete prikkels. 
De eerste studie van dit proefschrift beschrijf ik in hoofdstuk 4. I n  deze studie 
bestudeer ik de effecten wan flnancliele en sociale prikkels op de verdeling van werk 
iln een mu~lti-taslk omgeving. I n  een 2x2 experiment met twee onafhankelijke taken, 
waarvan prestaties op ee~n taak meetbaar en op een andere taak niet meetbaar zijn, 
vi~nid ik dal  individuen met financigle prikkels hun inspanning op de meetbare taak 
verhogen ten koste van hu~n in~spanning op de andere, niet meetbare, taak, De 
resultate~n tonen alan dat de voorkeur voor de taak die precies gemeten wordt, zowel 
in statistische als economische termen, beduidend wordt vermlnderd door sociale en 
ethische drulk, Met an~dere woorden, dle verdeling van werk over de twee taken 
wordt niet alleen gedreven door financiele prikkels, maar ook door de wens voor 
-tlaci~ale guedkeuri~aag en percoonlijke waarden. Verder zijn deelnemers indifferent 
tussen de twee taken als er een vastle prestatieonafhankelijke beloning verstrekt 
wordt. De bevindingen hebben belangrijke implicaties voor zowel theorie als 
praktijk. Dit experiment toont aan dat sociale reputatie en ethische waarden een 
belangrijke rol spellen blnnen management controle en dat fina~nciele prikkels 
ongewenste effecten kunnen hebben met betrekking tot de verdeling van werk over 
taken. Verdere analyse van de recu~litaten llaat zien dolt er een afweging gemaakt 
moet worden tlussen een optimale ve~rdeling van werk en een optimaal 
iinspanningsniveau. Hoewel een prestatieonafhankelijke beloning tot een gelijke 
verdeling van werk tussen taken leidt, is het inspanningsniveau van de agent 
beduidend lager. 
HooFdstuk 5 beschrijft de tweede studie van dit proefsclhrift. I n  een experirnen'tele 
arbeidsmarkt, waarin principalen de prestaties van agenten op twee kakenl 
evalueren, onderzoek ik de rol van impliciete prikkels (middels reputatie-effecten 
ten opzichte van de arbeidsmarkt) en expliciete financiële prikkels van agenten. De 
prestaties worden precies gemeten op e h  taak en met ruis ap een andere taak. Bij 
een prestatieafhankelijke belo~ni~ng alp beide taken riclhten agenten zich meer op de 
taak die precies gemeten wordt, en duidelijk minder op de ta~ak die met ruis 
gemetlo~n wordt. Deze verdeling blijft ook bestaan blij de aanwezigheid van een 
arbeidsmarkt, omdat agenten proberen vanuit carri&t-ebe18a~ng hun prestaties 
prolberein te s~ignalere~n. Agenten prefereren de precieze maatstaf am een signaalt 
aan de arbelidsrnarkt te  geven. Net als i~n de studie in hoofdstuk 4 zijn agen~ten bij 
een waste beloning in afwezigheid van een arbeidsmarkt indifferent tussen beide 
taken, Echter, In aanwezigheid wan een arbeidsmarkt die de prestaties van agenten 
evalueert, richten agenten zich meer op de precies gemeten taak. DUIS, in 
aanwezigheid van carribrebelang is een vast loon niet noodzakelijk optimaal voor de 
verdeling van werk tussen taken, die met verschillende kwaliteit gemeten worden. 
Agenten met expliciete financi@le prikkels m~et een hoger gewic~ht op de taak die met 
ruis gemleten wordt, richten hun werk meer op deze taak. Agenten zijn bijna 
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indifferent tussen taken als er bovendien nog een carrierebelang aanwemitg Is, Een 
hoger gewicht op de maatstaf met  ruis kan dus voor de principaal voordelig zijn. Dit 
is niet in overeenstemming met standaardvaorspellingen. Ex'pliciete financigle 
prikkels en impliciete prikkels gedreven door reputatie op een arbeidsmarkt zijn dus 
complementair jin een rnulti-task omgeving, en in contrast met theoretische 
voorspellin~gen kan de relatie tussen risico en gewichten op expliciete prikkels 
positief zijn. Verder laten bevindingen van deze studie zien dat de werkgevers in de 
experimentele arbeidsmarkt hun aanste.blingsbeclis;ingi nemen ap basis van beide 
prestatiernaatstaven, maar groter belang hechten aan de precieze maatstaf. Dit  
komt overeen met theoretische voorspellingen. 
I n  hoofdstuk 6 vat ik de resulltaten wan dit proefschrift samen en trek de valgende 
conclusies: 
Ten eerste, hebben financiele prikkels een sterke iinvloed op de verdeling wan werk 
in een multi-task omgeving. CPesalniettemi;n worden individuen naast financiële 
prikkels ook gemotiveerd deer andere mechanismen, zoals impliciete financiele 
prikkels in  een arbeidsmarkt evenals sociale groep en individuele normen. 
Ten tweede, hoeft het voor een principaal niet woardelig te zijln om vaste lonen aan 
te biedien, omdat de vaste lonen tot een lager algemeen Inspanningsniveaui kunnen 
leiden. Verder stemmen de inspanningen onder vaste lonen, in aanwesrgiheid van 
een carlrierebelarrg, niet noodzakelijk overeen met de doelstellingen van d e  
principaal, omda~t de werkverdel~ing van de algent door carri&~rezorgen en aigunale~n 
aan een arbeidsmarkt wordt beinvloed. 
Ten derde, terwljl expliciete financEt2le prikkels en carrièrezorgen volllgens de 
literatuur substituten zijn, brengen de resultaten valn di t  proefschrift naar voren dat 
deze twee elkaar aanvullen. 
Te~n vierde woerspelt de theorie dat er een negatief werband bestalat tussen ruis iln 
presitatiemaatstawe~n en de gewichten op expliciete financiele priklkelc. Dit 
proelrcrhrîft toont een situatie aan waar deze verhouding niet negatief rnaa~r positief 
is. 
Hoofdstuk 63 wordt afgesjaten met eien bespreking van de tekortkomingen valn het 
experimenteel anderzoek en er warden aan~bevelingen gedaan voor toekomctrg 
onderzoek op het gelbied van belioningsystemen in een rnwltl-task omgeving. 
